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Abstract
We investigate how a firm’s decision to hold excessive cash or to overinvest could influence 
its dividend payout policy in Indonesia. Additionally, we examine the association between 
corporate ownership structure and cash dividends. Using a data set of Indonesian listed 
firms for the period from 1995 to 2014, we find that excessive cash holding (overinvest-
ment) positively (negatively) affects a firm’s likelihood of paying dividends. Also, we find 
that family, foreign, state and institutional ownership have significantly negative links with 
dividends, which suggests the signals of expropriation of firms’ wealth by major sharehold-
ers. These findings strongly support the expropriation hypothesis that commonly applies to 
firms with higher level of concentration or to firms in a weak legal environment by which 
the rights of minority interests are put at risk by large shareholders.
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1 Introduction
Agency theory indicates that there are some potential problems when firms hold overcash 
(i.e., excessive cash holding) which can be related to managerial overcompensation and 
overinvestment (Jensen 1986; Fairchild 2010). Overcompensation and overinvestment can 
be intertwined as corporate managers could use cash flows to be invested in negative net 
present value (NPV) projects, which leads to managerial private benefits and to enhance 
managerial overcompensation due to the increasing scale of duty, firm size, and respon-
sibility (Jensen and Meckling 1979). On the other hand, such actions could be harmful to 
shareholders since some cash should be returned to them. Fuller and Blau (2010) name this 
situation as the “free cash flow problem” and to reduce this problem firms should pay divi-
dends to their shareholders.
In this study, we sought to address the following two questions: Is there any link between 
the decision to hold overcash and to overinvest and a firm’s dividend policy? Is there any 
association between a firm’s corporate governance, represented by ownership structure and 
types, and its dividend policy?
Therefore, our analysis focuses on two closely related issues. First, we examine the rela-
tion between a firm’s decision to hold overcash and to overinvest and dividend payout pol-
icy. The deviation from a firm’s optimal financial decisions, such as optimal cash holdings 
and optimal investment is a well-investigated area of research (e.g., Jiang and Lie 2016; 
Lin and Chiu 2017). Prior literature proposes several explanations as to why firms devi-
ate from their optimal cash holding levels or optimal investments. One explanation is that 
managers are risk averse and therefore holding overcash is intended to avoid the firm’s 
default and avoid market discipline (Opler et al. 1999); another explanation is that overcash 
gives managers greater flexibility to pursue their own objectives (Pinkowitz et al. 2006). 
These reasons are consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis (Easterbrook 1984) arguing 
that managers endowed with overcash could invest in projects having negative NPV rather 
than making payouts to shareholders (Lang et al. 1995). Further, Opler et al. (1999) also 
explain that overcash benefits the management to fund, whenever it wants to, investment 
projects, which outside creditors or investors are not interested in financing. Both overcash 
and overinvestment are conditions where a firm is unbalanced as a result of the managerial 
decisions, which are not convergent with shareholders’ interest. Richardson (2006) argues 
that overcash and overinvestment have impacts on managers’ behavior that lead to substan-
tial agency costs borne by shareholders.
Holding specific cash balances and making investments are managers’ strategic deci-
sions, which have effects on many other decisions, such as dividend payments, while the 
intensity of cash dividend payment is determined by the availability of cash held by the 
firm. A considerable number of researchers investigate the association between overcash 
and performance (Mikkelson and Partch 2003; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007), overin-
vestment and firm performance (Fu 2010), overinvestment and free cash flow (Richardson 
2006), overinvestment and dividend initiation announcement returns (Officer 2011). How-
ever, to our best knowledge, there is no study yet that addresses the effect of a firm’s deci-
sion to hold overcash and to overinvest on their dividend payout policy.
We next examine whether corporate ownership structure could alter a firm’s dividend 
payout policy. According to the agency theory, dividend policy as a product of a firm’s 
decision can be vulnerable to the abuses by powerful controlling shareholders to take pri-
vate benefits. La Porta et al. (2000b) show that, on the country level, minority shareholders 
in countries with weak investor protection receive lower dividends than those in countries 
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with strong legal protection of minority shareholders. Furthermore, La Porta et al. (2000a) 
contend that minority shareholders are well protected when their voting rights are properly 
enforced. Therefore, a country’s institutional characteristics have to be considered when 
studying payout policy to help explaining the changes in the propensity to pay dividends 
(Baker et  al. 2012). Empirical evidence shows that the majority shareholders use their 
firms’ cash flows for their own benefits, which would be detrimental to minority sharehold-
ers (Faccio et al. 2001).
We find that overcash and overinvestment variables affect significantly the propensity 
of firms to pay cash dividends. Therefore, firms that hold cash over their optimal target 
level tend to be more likely to pay dividends, whereas for firms that overinvest this ten-
dency reduces. When testing the association between corporate ownership and dividend 
policy, we find that the percentage of family ownership negatively affects the likelihood 
of firms to pay dividends. This finding suggests that family firms persistently retain profit 
to be invested within the firm to pursue the firm’s growth. It also suggests that managers 
of family firms are under strict control by family-related shareholders and they have made 
dividend decisions to the detriment of the minority shareholders. The findings thus tend 
to support the expropriation hypothesis, by which the rights of minority interests are put 
at risk by family stock owners. On the other hand, foreign investors and managerial own-
ership tend to have positive impacts on the propensity to pay dividends. These findings 
strongly support the hypothesis which commonly applies to firms with higher level of con-
centration or to firms in a weak legal environment by which firms use cash to be shifted to 
other businesses among their groups.
Our study provides three-folded contributions by further adding to the existing literature 
on dividend policy: Our first contribution is to investigate the effects of holding overcash 
and the decision to overinvest on a firm’s dividend policy. By doing so, we extend the 
previous studies that investigate the determinants of payout policy (e.g., Fuller and Blau 
2010; Twu 2012; Jacob and Michaely 2017). In addition, we distinguish our work from the 
extant literature in terms of the measurements used for overcash and overinvestment and 
explicitly test their effects on dividends payout policy. For example, Officer (2011) exam-
ines the market reaction to dividend initiations while controlling for cash holding defined 
as overcash relative to industry peers and overinvestment using Tobin’s Q measure. For our 
analysis, we use overinvestment based on Richardson’s (2006) model which appears to be 
a robust measure of overinvestment.1 Similarly, Holder et al. (1998), Mikkelson and Partch 
(2003), and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) use overcash to measure cash holdings, while 
we relied on the residuals from the excess cash regression produced by fitting Opler et al.’s 
(1999) model, where we report different results from that of Mikkelson and Partch (2003) 
who find that high cash firms do not pay high dividends.
Secondly, we further contribute to previous studies that have tested the effect of corpo-
rate governance on dividend policy (e.g., Baker et al. 2012; Ben-Nasr 2015). We differenti-
ate our study from previous studies by investigating the effect of various ownership types 
(i.e., family, foreign, state, managerial, and institutional) and ownership concentration 
on dividend policy in the context of principal–principal conflict of interest that generally 
occurs in a concentrated ownership structure while taking into account sub-optimal cash 
holding and investment inefficiencies.
1 Richardson’s construct is used by previous studies such as Chen et al. (2016).
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Finally, we examine the practices of dividend policy in Indonesia where a strong domi-
nation and control of a few shareholders exist. In the Indonesian market, a typical emerging 
market, large blockholders play a significant role in controlling firms’ decisions. Addition-
ally, in a large and growing body of literature in the last few decades, dividend policy has 
been highlighted from the perspective of another form of agency theory: a conflict of inter-
est between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.
There are several reasons why we use Indonesian data. Firstly, it has unique organiza-
tional forms, business practices, social structure, and political ties which could be incon-
sistent with value-creating business strategies (Ang et al. 1997; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 
2006). In addition, the unique social, political and business environment combined with 
the substantial growth of Indonesia capital markets, this study could broaden the finan-
cial literature which are dominated by studies focusing on developed markets. Secondly, 
the agency conflict between managers’ use of overcash and overinvestment on dividends 
could be more significant in Indonesian firms than firms in other countries, especially those 
in developed economies. The dividend policy in developed countries, such as in the US, 
is known to be sticky and stable over a period of time, with investors having better ex-
ante expectations for dividend policy (Jiang et al. 2017). These developed countries enjoy 
more established regulations and rule of law, which makes it more reasonable for firms to 
pay dividends and harder to change the payout policy. On the contrary, the weak corpo-
rate governance framework in the Indonesian market coupled with weak regulations (e.g., 
Leuz and Wysocki 2016) make it easier for firms to change their dividend policy accord-
ing to insiders’ will; hence, using an Indonesian data set provides an important motivation 
to check the validity of the hypotheses about agency conflicts. Thirdly, different from the 
typical Anglo-American countries with widely dispersed ownership, Indonesian firms have 
strong domination and control in the hands of controlling shareholders. In addition, exam-
ining Indonesian listed firms characterised by their opaque information due to the under-
developed accounting standards and weak regulation provides another good motivation to 
study this country which is different from the countries studied by La Porta et al. (1997) 
that include samples of more developed countries. Finally, the number of studies focus-
ing on the firms’ dividends policy in the Indonesian market is limited (e.g., Duygun et al. 
2018); hence, given all the above reasons, it is important to shed some light on the Indone-
sian firms’ behaviour with respect to their dividend payout policies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses theoretical argu-
ments for the determinants of cash dividends and formulates hypotheses to test. Section 3 
contains data and empirical models. Section  4 presents empirical analyses and findings. 
Finally, Sect. 5 concludes.
2  Literature review and hypotheses development
2.1  Overcash and dividend policy
Opler et al. (1999) find that firms with higher growth opportunities and riskier cash flows 
hold high ratios of cash to total non-cash assets. Dividends paid by a firm depend on the 
firm’s available free cash flow and its growth opportunities (Che et al. 2018). As proposed 
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by the life-cycle theory,2 mature firms with abundant free cash flow tend to pay higher 
dividends than young and growing firms. Young firms still struggle to pursue investment 
opportunities by investing their free cash flow. Consequently, such firms pay lower divi-
dends. Mature firms with a history of profitability should have larger free cash flows and 
accumulation of retained earnings as a source of financing. Firms with larger internal 
sources of funds can reduce the dependence of firms on external sources. On the other 
hand, higher cash flows lead to the escalation of agency conflict between shareholders and 
managers (Jensen 1986). To reduce such conflicts, dividends should be used as a device 
to monitor managers, to minimize the probability of using free cash flow for their own 
interest. Holder et al. (1998) and Guo (2016) find that there is a positive relation between 
cash flows and dividends, indicating that dividends are used as a tool to minimize agency 
conflict, as proposed by the agency theory. Regarding the measurement of free cash flow, 
Jensen (1986) uses overcash of the firm, while Denis and Osobov (2008) use the ratio of 
retained earnings to book equity, and Fama and French (2001) use the ratio of retained 
earnings to total assets.
The firm’s ability to pay dividends, as one form of the use of funds, is determined by the 
firm’s financial resources, such as retained earnings. According to the residual theory of 
dividend (Miller and Modigliani 1961), firms will only pay dividends as long as there is no 
investment giving positive net present value. This means that corporate profits should be 
retained to finance investment projects which support the firm’s future revenues. Agency 
theory explains that dividends can be a tool to mitigate agency conflict between share-
holders and managers (Jensen 1986). Jensen (1986) proposes the free cash flow theory, 
asserting that when a firm has free cash flow while there is no profitable investment, the 
firm should pay its cash to shareholders. This is to avoid the use of the firm’s cash by 
managers to fulfill their own interests. The theory indicates that managers could use the 
firm’s cash for their private benefits or for investing in unprofitable projects. To minimize 
the occurrence of these possibilities, shareholders could require a higher dividend as a tool 
to reduce agency costs (Borokhovich et al. 2005). In this type of control structure, minor-
ity shareholders are vulnerable to being expropriated by controlling shareholders (Gugler 
2003). Agency theory predicts that shareholders prefer to receive dividends rather than let 
the extra cash flow be retained by the firm. Ceteris paribus, firms with larger cash flows pay 
more dividends when agency conflicts do not exist. We therefore propose the first set of 
hypotheses as follows:
H1a: The probability of firms paying dividends increases if the firms are holding overcash.
H1b: Firms with overcash pay larger dividends.
2.2  Overinvestment and dividend policy
Corporate managers make decisions whether the firm’s cash flows will be retained as inter-
nally-generated capital or will be returned to the shareholders as dividends. The choice 
could depend on the availability of profitable projects. The theory of residual dividend 
2 Yu et al. (2015) provide supporting evidence in line with the life-cycle theory. They report significant dif-
ferences in the drivers of cash holdings for firms which are more than 5 years old relative to firms which are 
less than 5 years old.
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argues that the cash flow should be prioritized to finance profitable investments which con-
tribute to shareholder wealth maximization, whilst dividends are paid as residual, which 
occurs in the ideal world (Miller and Modigliani 1961). The consequence is that firms 
could pay less dividends although the firm obtains abundant cash flow. Consistent with 
pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf 1984), internally-generated capital will be the first 
choice of source of project funding since it is less costly than other external funds, such 
as debt or issuing stock. However, the question is whether the investments made by the 
firms are truly value-enhancing projects for the benefits of shareholders, or are sub-optimal 
projects, at the expense of shareholders, for the sake of managers’ empire buildings (Fair-
child 2010), non-productive acquisition (Harford 1999), and to obtain higher compensa-
tion (Jensen 1986). Further, Kuo (2013) finds a positive relation between cash dividends 
and the firm’s future earnings response when the firm is in severe free cash flow problem. 
This indicates that higher cash payout reduces managerial over-investment. Overinvest-
ment occurs when a firm spends more on investment projects than the average for firms in 
the same industry. This decision is a product of managers’ over optimism regarding future 
returns of their projects (Ahmed and Duellman 2013). Easterbrook (1984) highlights an 
assumption that managers are not perfect agents of shareholders and managers try to pur-
sue their benefits, causing a divergence of interest between managers and shareholders. 
Richardson (2006) provides a theoretical foundation for overinvestment theory, suggesting 
that managers could overinvest when the firm has more cash flow. Firms with overinvest-
ment tend to spend more cash that, in turn, will affect firm’s ability to pay dividends. Cet-
eris paribus, over investing firms will pay low dividends. Thus, we posit that:
H2a: The probability of paying dividends decreases if a firm is overinvesting.
H2b: Firms with overinvestment inefficiencies pay less dividends.
2.3  Corporate governance and dividend policy
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that large shareholders tend to accumulate more cash and 
pay lower dividends. In addition, they point out that large shareholders can take a number 
of measures to expropriate firm assets through intra group sales and service and transfer 
pricing, whereas Faccio et  al. (2001) argue that ownership concentration has a negative 
relation with dividends, indicating that there is a conflict of interest between majority and 
minority shareholder in firms with concentrated ownership. Jain and Chu (2014) inves-
tigate how country level variations affect the dividend payout policies. Using a sample 
across 32 countries, however, they find that firms pay higher dividends in countries with 
poor protection of minority shareholders. It is therefore hypothesized below that firms with 
higher levels of ownership concentration are associated with lower dividend payment.
H3a: The probability of firms paying dividends decreases if the level of ownership con-
centration is high.
H3b: The higher the level of ownership concentration, the smaller is the dividend 
payments.
Studies show the existence of family as the main shareholders in East Asian firms 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et  al. 2000a; Faccio et  al. 2001). In the context of 
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unifying ownership and control, family-controlled firms should have low agency costs due 
to the convergence of interest between principal and agent (Jensen and Meckling 1979). As 
argued by Gugler (2003), family-controlled firms have lower agency cost because of the 
closer control of managers by the family as dominant shareholder. However, Bertrand et al. 
(2000) claim that such family-controlled managers can act to maximize the family’s wealth 
via tunneling or removing corporate resources through the intra-business transactions. Kim 
et al. (2005) further support this assertion. Using a sample of Korean firms, they provide 
evidence of a tunnelling behavior where the ownership structure distorts the allocation of 
internal funds in such a way to benefit the controlling shareholders. Such family-controlled 
firms are less protective to minority shareholders (Claessens et  al. 2002). Faccio et  al. 
(2001) point out the managers of such family-controlled firms can invest in low return pro-
jects as an indication of expropriation of minority shareholders. Hence, we conjecture that:
H4a: The probability of a firm to pay dividends decreases if the percentage of shares held 
by families is larger.
H4b: The larger the percentage of shares held by the families, the lower the dividends.
Numerous studies examine the motivation of the presence of foreign investors who are 
involved in stock market transactions. They can be classified into two broad categories: 
strategic investors with long term interest, and financial buyers with short term interest in 
holding firm stock. As strategic investors, they have the interest to increase firm perfor-
mance by conducting controlling functions. Jeon et al. (2011) argue that foreign investors 
have more effective control and supervision due to their global standards and practices, 
which enable the firm to promote better governance practices. However, because of higher 
informational asymmetry compared to domestic investors, foreign investors require higher 
dividends to compensate for additional risk. Our next set of hypotheses then follows:
H5a: The probability of a firm to pay dividends increases if the percentage of shares held 
by foreign investors is larger.
H5b: The larger the percentage of shares held by foreign investors, the larger the 
dividends.
The dividends paid to the state-owned enterprises (SOE) as shareholders are crucial 
as they are one of the main government revenue sources. Because of the significant con-
tribution to government revenues, the state as the main stockholder frequently targets the 
amount of dividend from SOEs to cover government budget. The typical characteristics 
of dividend policy of SOEs were investigated by some studies. Ben-Nasr (2015), using a 
sample of privatised firms from 43 countries, finds that government ownership enjoys a 
statistically significantly negative relation with dividends which is consistent with the pre-
diction of agency theory. He also reports strong and robust evidence that higher degree of 
state ownership is associated with lower propensity to pay dividends. In India, Mishra and 
Narender (1996) point out that the Indian government set a minimum dividend declaration 
for SOEs unless the firms set a proposal for expansion or diversification. In their study in 
China, in which most of the publicly listed firms are government-owned at least partially, 
Wei and Varela (2003) find that there is a positive link between government ownership and 
dividends, where they report that the higher the ownership by government, the higher the 
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dividends. The government expects SOEs to have high performance and pay a high divi-
dend to the government. Thus, we expect that:
H6a: The probability of a firm to pay dividends increases if the percentage of shares held 
by the state is larger.
H6b: The larger the percentage of shares held by the state, the larger the dividends.
Agency theory argues that agency costs, as an effect caused by the divergence of inter-
est between shareholders and managers, can be reduced by increasing dividend payment 
(Rozeff 1984). As a result, firms are forced to raise external financing from outside inves-
tors such as investment banks and other new investors which, in turn, can control the man-
agers. Being monitored by the external investors, managers will have less possibility of 
utilizing firms’ assets for their own benefits. Another alternative to reduce agency cost is 
that managers need to increase their share ownership to have better aligning of interest with 
shareholder (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The larger the proportion of stocks held by man-
agers, the higher the dividends. However, having a higher proportion of stocks to control 
agency cost is not costless, because the managers will have less opportunity to diversify 
their wealth. Consequently, the managers will compensate the cost of the decreasing wealth 
due to the reduced opportunity to diversify their wealth to other media of investment by 
paying larger dividends. On the other hand, Schooley and Barney (1994) argue that execu-
tive stock ownership reduces agency cost and decreases dividends. However, until the own-
ership exceeds a specific point, higher stock ownership increases dividend payments. Our 
corresponding hypotheses are as follows:
H7a: The probability of a firm paying dividends increases if the percentage of shares held 
by managers is larger.
H7b: The larger the percentage of shares held by managers, the larger the dividends.
Allen et al. (2000) argue that institutional investors have good abilities to monitor firm 
management since they have a substantial amount of stocks in the firm. Tee et al. (2018) 
find that institutional ownership plays a major role in monitoring managers by reducing the 
positive association between politically connected firms and stock price crashes. The insti-
tutional investor can also force managers to impose a large penalty when the managers cut 
dividends (Leary and Michaely 2011). This means that institutional investors have an inter-
est in the certainty of dividends as a return on their strategic investment in the firm. Institu-
tional shareholders with significant control of firms require high dividends to mitigate the 
agency problem when managers use firms’ free cash flows for their own benefits or use the 
cash to be invested in unprofitable projects, in line with Jensen’s (1986) proposition of the 
agency cost hypothesis. In other words, institutional investors require higher dividends to 
mitigate agency costs of free cash flow. Gul and Kealey (1999) find no association between 
Korean Chaebol firms, who are characterized by concentrated institutional ownership, and 
dividends. However, Allen and Michaely (2003) argue that firms paying dividend attract 
more institutional investors and such investors can monitor managers better than individ-
ual investors. The better monitoring and control of institutional investors will reduce the 
agency problem that arises between managers and shareholders. In addition, the clientele 
dividend theory states that firms pay dividends because of different clients of shareholders. 
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Firms having more institutional investors pay higher and more frequent dividends than 
firms with more individual investors. We therefore suggest that:
H8a: The probability of a firm to pay dividends increases if the percentage of shares held 
by institutional shareholders is larger.
H8b: The higher the institutional ownership in the firm, the larger the dividends.
3  Data description and summary statistics
3.1  Data description
Our sample comprises all non-financial firms listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), for 
the period between 1995 and 2014. During this period of study, we intended to capture the 
dynamic situation of the Indonesian economy within which two economic shocks occurred 
namely, the 1997/1998 Southeast Asia economic crisis and the 2008 global financial cri-
sis; hence, obtaining a better understanding of the dividend policy of IDX firms. We use 
Reuters Datastream to retrieve firms’ financial information, while the data on stock owner-
ship are obtained from the Indonesia Capital Market Directory (ICMD).3 From the original 
universe of all listed firms in IDX, we eliminate all financial firms in the sample following 
Fama and French (2001), and firms with observations less than four.4
As of December 2014, there were 502 firms listed in the IDX, but after removing finan-
cial firms (74 firms), missing and incomplete data, and eliminating firms carrying out IPO 
between 2012 and 2014, the final sample is a panel data set that contains 5386 firm-year 
observations representing 385 unique firms.
Table 1 represents the structure of the data used, containing, in panel A, the number of 
firms for each N years, while panel B provides the number of observations across each year 
from 1995 to 2014.
3.2  Summary statistics
Table  2 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study. The table 
shows that the average DPS is IDR64.27 with a standard deviation of IDR533.6. The 
maximum DPS is IDR12,000, which is equal to USD1 using the exchange rate in Decem-
ber 2014, suggesting that IDX firms pay low dividends relative to US firms. The average 
DIVTA is only 0.01 meaning that cash dividend paid for the period of 20 years equals 1% 
of assets with a maximum of 17.8%. OverCash shows an average of 73.13% indicating 
that almost two-thirds of firm-year observations have cash over their optimal target ratio, 
whereas overinvestment shows an average of 38.26%, meaning that less than half of IDX 
firm-year observations belong to the case of overinvestment.
The degree of concentration, measured by the square root of the five largest stockhold-
ers, indicates an average of 40.89%, suggesting that most of the IDX firms are categorized 
3 The Indonesia Capital Market Directory is an independent data provider in Indonesia.
4 During the sample period, new firms are including in the sample if they underwent an IPO process before 
2011 to guarantee a minimum of four observations for each firm.
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into concentrated ownership. In addition, by examining the maximum value of concentra-
tion, some shareholders have controlled nearly 100% of the stocks.
By comparing the absolute percentage of stock ownership, foreign ownership is the 
highest, followed by State, managerial, family and institutional ownership. Foreign own-
ership shows the maximum 92%, with average 12.76%. The figure suggests that foreign 
investment has been a significant amount, particularly after Indonesia liberalized its capital 
market after the financial crisis 1997/1998, for which foreign investors were allowed to 
invest up to 99% of IDX’s equity.
The average percentage of shares held by families (Family1) is relatively low, that is, 
only 3.08% with a maximum of 66%. However, the low percentage is due to the method 
of measurement, which is based on immediate ownership, whereas the typical family 
ownership of Indonesian firms is that family commonly use cross-holdings and indirect 
ownership.
Table  2 shows that state ownership (State1) has an average 1.82%, indicating that 
the government invests only in firms categorized as SOEs. In contrast, the State has 
no equity stake in private firms listed in IDX, except in a joint venture between Jakarta 
Table 1  Frequency of 
observations
The table provides the distribution of observations for each year across 
the sample period. Panel A reports the number of firms for each year. 
Firms considered in the study are those having data for at least four 
consecutive years. The data are retrieved from Datastream and Indone-
sian Capital Market Directory for the period between 1995 and 2014. 
Panel B reports the number of observations for each year
Panel A Panel B
N (years) Number of firms Year Number of 
observations
1 0 1995 136
2 0 1996 137
3 0 1997 144
4 11 1998 155
5 13 1999 177
6 18 2000 216
7 29 2001 222
8 32 2002 233
9 15 2003 236
10 10 2004 256
11 20 2005 265
12 4 2006 282
13 10 2007 313
14 7 2008 342
15 35 2009 360
16 21 2010 374
17 10 2011 384
18 6 2012 384
19 4 2013 385
20 140 2014 385
Total firms 385 Total 5386
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governmental province and a property firm. This study shows that there are 11 SOEs 
listed in IDX, consisting of pharmacy (2 firms), energy (1), steel (1), telecommunication 
(1), construction (4), and mining industries (2). As many as 15 SOEs undertook IPO 
between 1995 and 2014; four of them are banks. This means that all SOEs listed in the 
capital market occurred within the period.
Table 2  Summary statistics
The study uses 385 firms with 5386 firm-year observations for the 
period between 1995 and 2014. All data are from Datastream and 
Indonesian Capital Market Directory. The values of all financial vari-
ables are reported in the Indonesian Rupiah (IDR). All ownership 
related variables represent the fractions and are in decimal values. 
Size is reported in million rupiahs and age is in the year. The non-
ratio variables (i.e., DPS, Age, Size) are logarithmic-transformed for 
the regression analyses. The definitions of all variables are provided in 
the “Appendix”
Variable N Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Dummy dividend 5331 0.5003 0.500 0 1
DPS (IDR) 5331 64.2700 533.60 0 12,000
DIVTA 5331 0.0100 0.0270 0 0.1780
Excess cash 5331 -0.0005 0.986 − 3.0913 1.9587
OverCash 5331 0.7313 0.4433 0 1
Excess investment 5331 -0.0092 0.7974 − 3.6167 1.3333
Overinvestment 5331 0.3826 0.4932 0 1
Concentration 4823 0.4089 0.2286 0.10 0.9998
Family1 3047 0.0308 0.1048 0 0.6600
Family2 3047 0.0479 0.2136 0 1
Family3 3047 0.0279 0.1646 0 1
Foreign1 3023 0.1276 0.2435 0 0.92
Foreign2 3023 0.1404 0.3474 0 1
Foreign3 3023 0.1146 0.3185 0 1
State1 3023 0.0182 0.1055 0 0.9
State2 3023 0.0347 0.1830 0 1
Managerial1 3673 0.0360 0.1077 0 0.89
Managerial2 3673 0.0608 0.2391 0 1
Managerial3 3673 0.0388 0.1931 0 1
Institutional 3023 0.0037 0.0190 0 0.13
Size (million IDR) 5331 4000 10,700 554 233,000
Growth 4857 0.1979 0.4263 − 0.7507 2.3491
MVBV 4669 1.4313 1.0210 0.3141 6.6192
Free cash flow 5142 0.1607 0.2416 − 0.3639 1.2859
Leverage 5183 0.2938 0.2301 0 0.8862
Tangibility 5196 0.3971 0.2439 0.0022 0.9222
Fixed charges 5036 0.0279 0.0323 0 0.1851
Profitability 5198 0.0267 0.1157 − 0.4967 0.3608
Risk 4657 0.8089 0.5928 − 0.612 2.4530
Age 5331 34.119 16.8070 4 108
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Managerial ownership (Managerial1) shows an average 3.6% with maximum 89%. 
Many of the IDX firms are family dominated firms with one or more manager-related fam-
ily; managers could use indirect ownership via cross holdings ownership. The average per-
centage of institutional ownership is the lowest one with only 0.37%, and the maximum is 
13%. Financial institutions such as insurance and pension funds as their portfolio interest 
commonly own the institutional shares. Regarding the value of assets, firm size indicates 
a substantial book value of assets due to the high denomination of IDR currency but low 
exchange rate. The average firm size is IDR4 billion, with a minimum of IDR554 million 
and maximum of IDR233 trillion.
Table 3 provides the correlation matrix for the variables used in this study. Higher cor-
relations occur in ownership variables because of the classification. For instance, variables 
within the family group, such as family1, family2, and family3, have high coefficient cor-
relations. The high correlation coefficients also occur for groups of variables of foreign, 
state, and managerial ownership. For the purposes of regression analysis, however, vari-
ables with high correlation are not included in the model.
3.3  Mean difference tests
The test is intended to statistically analyze whether the two groups (dividend payers and 
non-dividend payers) are significantly different. Table  4 presents the values of mean, 
median (in brackets under the payer and non-payer columns), mean difference, and the sta-
tistical t test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test (in brackets) for the variables used in this study. 
Columns 2 and 3 show the mean of each variable for dividend payers and non-dividend 
payers, while the mean differences are presented in column 4. The positive sign indicates 
that the mean of dividend payers for a given variable is larger than that of non-dividend 
payers.
Table  4 shows that mean difference is highly significant at the 5% and 1% levels in 
almost all variables in which dividend payers have a higher mean than non-dividend pay-
ers. For variables of family1, State1, leverage, tangibility, and fixed charges, the mean of 
dividend payers is less than that of non-dividend payers. We find the average percentage 
of ownership, for family1 and managerial1, of non-dividend payers is larger than those of 
dividends-payers. However, it is normal for firms to have higher leverage and fixed charges 
to become non-dividend payers. This suggests that debt and fixed charges reduce the prob-
ability and the intensity of firms paying dividends.
4  Empirical methodology
4.1  Baseline models
To examine the likelihood of firms paying dividends and to analyze the differential prob-
ability for capturing the propensity to pay dividends, we estimate the following probit 
model:
(1)
Prob
(
Yi,t > 0
)
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1OverCashi,t + 𝛽2Overinvestmenti,t + 𝛽3Concentrationi,t
+ 𝜓m
5∑
m=1
Ownershipi,t + 𝛾n
10∑
n=1
Control Variablei,t + 𝜋p
19∑
p=1
Yearp + 𝜏q
6∑
q=1
Industryq + 𝜀i,t
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Table 4  Characteristics of dividends payers and non-payers groups
The table compares the characteristic of dividend paying firms (Payer) with non-dividend paying firms 
(Non-payer) by reporting the mean and median (in brackets under each variable for the Payer and Non-
Payer columns). Also, we report the mean difference, the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed rank-test (in brack-
ets) of dividend paying and non-dividend paying firms. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. The definitions of all variables are provided in “Appendix”
Payer Non-payer Mean difference t test (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test)
Overcash 0.409 0.321 0.061 7.564***
(1) (1) (7.536)***
Overinvestment 0.304 0.277 0.019 2.571***
(1) (1) (2.571)**
Concentration 0.417 0.389 0.029 7.977***
(0.366) (0.332) (5.916)***
Family1 0.377 0.437 − 0.060 − 2.140**
(0.32) (0.5) (− 2.384)**
Foreign1 0.535 0.474 0.061 3.700***
(0.510) (0.450) (2.764)***
State1 0.548 0.697 − 0.149 6.795***
(0.55) (0.69) (7.502)***
Managerial1 0.444 0.438 0.005 − 2.906
(0.348) (0.392) (− 0.258)
Institutional 0.598 0.436 0.162 0.195
(0.6) (0.5) (0.935)
Size (Ln Total Assets) 17.555 16.290 1.265 2.336***
(0.51) (0.435) (5.761)***
Growth 0.269 0.225 0.044 1.887**
(0.239) (0.219) (9.649)***
MVBV 1.567 1.447 0.120 8.792***
(1.276) (1.156) (8.644)***
Free cash flow 0.287 0.264 0.023 5.847***
(0.258) (0.261) (10.140)***
Leverage 0.391 0.445 − 0.054 − 5.886
(0.357) (0.428) (− 2.044)**
Tangibility 0.424 0.565 − 0.141 − 3.492
(0.388) (0.485) (− 1.161)
Fixed charges 0.369 0.399 − 0.030 − 5.472
(0.299) (0.336) (− 0.239)
Profitability 0.332 0.096 0.236 23.516***
(0.311) (0.165) (25.037)***
Risk 0.875 0.832 0.044 5.600***
(0.844) (0.791) (7.998)***
Age 35.417 27.954 7.463 7.875***
(34) (27) (4.980)***
where “Prob(Yi,t> 0)” indicates a firm’s likelihood to pay dividends (i.e., Zi,t= 1 if Yi,t> 0); 
Yi,t is a measure of the propensity to pay dividends by firm i in year t; βs, ψs, γs, πs and τs 
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are estimable slope parameters; α is the constant term. Ownership variables consist of (i) 
family; (ii) foreign; (iii) state; (iv) managerial; and (v) institutional. Following the previous 
literature on the decision to pay dividends and the determinants of dividend payout, we 
include a number of control variables in the decision to pay a dividend, that is, profitabil-
ity; leverage (Hu and Kumar 2004); free cash flow (Eisdorfer et al. 2015); size and market 
to book value (Fuller and Blau 2010); growth, size, risk, and age (Twu 2012); and tangibil-
ity and fixed charges (Aivazian et al. 2003).5
Following previous studies (e.g., Opler et al. 1999; Harford et al. 2008; Jiang and Lie 
2016; El Kalak and Tosun 2019), for each year, we estimate the excess cash for firm i as 
the residual of the following cross-sectional regression:
where Cash is the ratio of cash to total assets; R&D is the research and development 
expenses over sales ratio; NWC is the ratio of net working capital minus cash over total 
assets; CAPEX is capital expenditure over total assets; Payout Ratio is the sum of cash 
dividend divided by total assets. In this setting, the residual εi is used as a proxy for firm 
i’s excess cash in a given year. A positive (negative) residual indicates that the firm hoards 
more (less) cash than it needs for its normal operational activities and investments during 
that year. For the purpose of our study, we define OverCash as a dummy variable which is 
1 when the residual is positive, which indicates that cash is in excess of normal operations 
and investments, and 0 otherwise.
As for the estimation of overinvestment, we use the same set of variables used by Rich-
ardson (2006) to estimate the residual. However, we depart from the method of Richardson 
(2006) by following previous literature, such as Chen et al. (2016) and Guariglia and Yang 
(2016), where we use a panel data regression with fixed effects to estimate the deviation 
investment as the residual of Eq. (3). The use of panel data estimation allow for a partial 
adjustment mechanism to control for unobserved factors not included among regressors, 
where the residual 휀i is used as a proxy for firm i’s deviation investment (excess investment) 
in a given year. A positive (negative) residual indicates that the firm over (under) invests 
during that year. For the purpose of our study, we define Overinvestment as a dummy vari-
able that equals 1 when the residual is positive, which indicates that the firm overinvest in 
that particular year, and 0 otherwise.6
(2)
Cashi = 훼 + 훽1Free Cash Flowi + 훽2Leveragei + 훽3MVBVi + 훽4Sizei + 훽5NWCi
+ 훽6CAPEXi + 훽7Payout Ratioi + 훽8R&Di + 훽9Agei + 휀i
(3)
New Investmenti,t = 훼 + 훽1New Investmenti,t−1 + 훽2Other Controlsi,t−1 + 휂i + 휙t + 휀i,t
6 In an untabulated results, to verify the robustness of our estimation of overinvestment, we use the fol-
lowing three methods: (i) we implement Richardson’s (2006) set of explanatory variables using the system 
GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond 1998). The system GMM estimator is used to take into account unob-
served firm heterogeneity and the possible endogeneity and mis-measurement problems of the regressors. 
This method has been used by Antoniou et al. (2008), Guariglia and Yang (2016) and Ding et al. (2016); (ii) 
we use Bates (2005) approach that determines whether firms overinvest by comparing the capital expendi-
ture ratios of each firm operating in a given industry in a given year with the median ratio of all firms 
operating in the same industry during that year. If the difference is positive (negative), then this approach 
assumes the firm overinvested (underinvested); (iii) following Ding et al. (2016) we define overinvestment 
when the investment ratio of a sample firm in a given industry and year is in excess of the median value of 
all firms operating in the same industry in that year. Our results remain qualitatively robust for the use of 
these different methods.
5 Definition of variables is provided in the Appendix (Table 10).
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where NewInvestment = Capital Expenditure + Research and Development (R&D)—
Depreciation and Amortization. OtherControls include Growth Opportunities, Leverage, 
Free Cash Flow, Cash, Age, Size, and Stock returns. ηi represents firm fixed effects while 
휙t denotes year fixed effects.
Furthermore, to examine the intensity of paying dividends we run model (1) using the 
OLS method while changing the dependent variable Yit to capture the level of dividends 
by using two measures namely, dividends per share (DPS) and dividends over total assets 
(DIVTA). Table 10 in the “Appendix” lists all the variables used in the study as well as 
specifying their definitions and expected signs.
4.2  Robustness tests
The challenge we face when attempting to identify a causal effect of overcash, overinvest-
ment, and ownership-related variables on the firm’s dividend policies is the possibility of 
omitted variable bias. The section addresses these endogeneity concerns in the following 
two different ways. First, we employ an instrumental variable approach namely the gen-
eralized method of moments with instrumental variables (IV-GMM). Second, we use the 
Heckman’s two-step estimation procedures to consider sample selection bias having poten-
tial determinants in affecting dividend decisions.
4.2.1  The IV‑GMM estimation method
Antoniou et al. (2008) suggest that the use of OLS estimation as shown in Eq. 1 produces 
biased coefficients because time-specific effect (휇i) is unobservable, and it correlates with 
other regressors. In addition, the OLS strictly assumes that all of the explanatory variables 
are exogenous. To overcome the problem, we use fixed effects estimation and IV-GMM 
to test the robustness of estimation by treating ownership-related explanatory variables as 
endogenous. In a model with endogenous variables, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest the 
use of the instrumental variables (IV) technique by generating lagged values of variables. 
We use internal instruments for the factors related to corporate ownership structure by 
using their lags up to three periods.
The IV-GMM requires that the correlation between an instrumental variable (Z) and 
error (η) to be orthogonal, or Cov (Z, η) = 0, and the covariance between an instrumental 
and endogenous explanatory variable (S) is different from zero, or Cov (S, Z) ≠ 0. There-
fore, there will be two tests regarding the endogeneity problem. First, the Hausman test is 
used to identify whether a potentially exogenous variable is actually endogenous. Second, 
the Sargan–Hansen test is used to test the null hypothesis stating that the overidentifying 
restrictions are valid.
4.2.2  Heckman’s two‑step estimation procedure
Heckman’s two-step technique is commonly used to investigate a firm’s decision on divi-
dend policy. It consists of two steps: (i) the propensity to pay dividends, and (ii) the inten-
sity to dividend payments. The propensity to pay dividends examines the likelihood of 
firms paying cash dividends. The intensity of paying dividends is measured by the amount 
of dividends paid. The OLS model estimation below is a censored regression model which 
can be used for Heckman’s two-step estimation procedures.
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where “E(DPSit, DIVTAit |Zi,t = 1)” indicates the expected intensity level if firms pay div-
idends with DPS and DIVTA as dependent variables; βs, ψs, γs, πs and τs are estima-
ble slope parameters; vit is the idiosyncratic error term that is jointly normally distributed 
giving zero means and the correlation of rho (ρ); lambda (λ) is the inverse Mill’s ratio 
obtained for the purpose of selection correction in which a significant Mill’s ratio implies 
the presence of the sample selection bias.
5  Main findings
5.1  The propensity to pay dividends
Table 5 presents the determinants of firms paying dividends using the probit estimations. 
Panel A reports the raw coefficient estimation, and Panel B reports the marginal effects. 
The results of regression in Model1 reveal that the propensity to pay dividends is positively 
related to overcash (statistically significant at the 5% level), suggesting that firms with 
overcash have a higher probability of paying dividends. The finding supports Hypothesis 
1a stating that the probability of a firm paying dividends increases if a firm is over-cashed. 
Holder et al. (1998) find that overcash has a positive relation with dividends. Further, the 
relation between overinvestment and the propensity to pay dividends is negative and sig-
nificant as shown in model 3. This indicates that overinvestment is a strong determinant of 
a firm’s decision to pay or not to pay dividends. The result supports Hypothesis 2a stating 
that the probability of a firm paying dividends decreases if a firm is overinvested. This is 
consistent with Richardson’s (2006) study showing that firms with overcash tend to overin-
vest, which results in lower dividend payments.
The propensity to pay dividends has a significant and negative link with the percentage 
of family ownership, suggesting that the larger the family ownership, the lower the likeli-
hood of firms paying dividends. The finding is consistent with our Hypothesis 4a stating 
that families expropriate the firm’s cash for their own interest by decreasing the probability 
of paying dividends to shareholders. The finding is also consistent with the results of the 
t-test and Wilcoxon test as shown in Table 4, suggesting that the higher the family owner-
ship, the lower the probability of a firm paying dividends. However, model 1 also exhibits 
that managerial ownership is positively and significantly related to the propensity of paying 
dividends; the larger the managerial ownership, the higher the likelihood of a firm paying 
dividend. In model 1, when family ownership and managerial ownership are simultane-
ously regressed in a single model, their coefficients are significant but have different signs. 
This indicates that managers and families have different interests regarding dividend pay-
ment. The finding supports the agency cost theory, which asserts that the principal and 
agent are divergent regarding their interests.
(4)
E
(
DPSi,t,DIVTAi,t|Zi,t = 1
)
= 훼 + 훽1OverCashi,t + 훽2Overinvestmenti,t + 훽3Concentrationi,t
+ 훽4휆i,t + 휓m
5∑
m=1
Ownershipi,t + 훾n
10∑
n=1
Control Variablei,t
+ 휋p
19∑
p=1
Yearp + 휏q
6∑
q=1
Industryq + vi,t
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In Panel A, foreign2 and foreign3 are positively and significantly associated with the 
propensity of the firm paying dividends (models 2 and 3). These results demonstrate that 
the larger the proportion of foreign ownership, the higher the propensity of firms paying 
dividends. In other words, this finding indicates that the probability of a firm paying divi-
dends increases if the percentage of shares held by independent investors is larger. This can 
also mean that foreign investors require a higher dividend to compensate higher country 
risk (Jeon et al. 2011) as predicted in Hypothesis 5a. In addition, other types of ownership 
such as state and institutional indicate a weak relation with the propensity to pay dividends.
Panel B reports the marginal effects of explanatory variables on the propensity of pay-
ing dividends. The coefficients of overcash (models 5 and 6) are strongly related to the pro-
pensity to pay dividends. Their significant coefficients explain that one standard deviation 
increase (i.e., 44.33%, see Table 2) in overcash raises the probability of paying dividends 
by 8.1% and 6.6%, respectively.
In Panel B, the marginal effects for overinvestment are negative and statistically signifi-
cant. The effect in model 5 explains that a one standard deviation increase in overinvest-
ment (i.e., 49.32%) reduces the probability of paying dividends by 5.8%. Examining the 
marginal effects among these ownership variables, only managerial ownership has a strong 
relation with the propensity to pay dividends. For the other variables: Managerial1 and 
Managerial2 (models 5 and 6) showing a significant relation with the propensity to pay div-
idends, their marginal effects suggest that the likelihood of paying dividends increases by 
29.3% and 10% as a response to one standard deviation increase (i.e., 10.77% and 23.91%), 
respectively. In addition, the level of concentration has a statistically weak relation with 
the propensity to pay dividends. Finally, the lower parts of Panel B show the coefficients of 
determination, which explain the aggregate test of the variables of the model.7
5.2  The level of dividend payments: DPS as dependent variable
Table  6 exhibits the regression results using three estimation methods: OLS, IV-GMM, 
and FE for different endogenous ownership variables. Under OLS, overcash has a strong 
relation with DPS for all ownership types. On the other hand, overinvestment is statisti-
cally significant only when ownership structure is based on managerial ownership. Further, 
ownership concentration is significant in almost all models with a positive sign, indicating 
that the higher the level of ownership concentration, the larger the level of dividends. The 
results thus support our hypothesis (H3). One possible explanation for this finding is that 
the ownership structure of the IDX firms is dominated by the largest five shareholders with 
full control rights on management’s decision making and these large shareholders tend to 
make larger dividend payments rather than accumulating more cash. Our results support 
the findings of Kim et al. (2013) who report that controlling shareholders in Korean firms 
have strong influence on payout policies. However, our finding contradicts those indicated 
by previous studies that large shareholders pay lower dividends (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 
1997; Faccio et al. 2001).
Family and state ownership have weak relations with the level of dividend payments. 
However, foreign, managerial and institutional ownership have strong links with dividends, 
7 In untabulated results, we re-estimate our main model in Eq.  (1) where we have divided our sample 
according to firm size (large vs. small firms based on the median values) and industry category (manufac-
turing vs. non-manufacturing firms). The results remain qualitatively unchanged.
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particularly under the OLS setting. However, only managerial ownership yields consist-
ent estimates under both the OLS and IV-GMM methods. The relation between foreign 
ownership and dividends indicates that firms with higher levels of foreign ownership pay 
less dividends, which contradicts our hypothesis (H5). This suggests that foreign inves-
tors do not consider the asymmetry of information with regards to domestic investors. In 
other words, they perceive that risk associated with their investment in IDX firms can be 
effectively anticipated by taking some measures. Therefore, they are willing to receive less 
dividends. An alternative explanation is that foreign investors perform long run investment 
in IDX firms, and most of the operating profits are retained as a source of internal fund.
The managerial ownership has a positive and significant relation with dividends, sup-
porting our hypothesis (H7). As proposed by the agency theory, higher managerial own-
ership reduces agency cost because it gives better alignment between the interests of the 
agents and shareholders. Additionally, the negative relation between institutional owner-
ship and dividends implies that such institutions (pension funds, mutual funds, insurance 
firms, and other financial institutions) do not have any strong influence on a firm’s dividend 
policy. This differs with the typical institutional investors in developed countries whereby 
they can exert considerable influence upon firms’ top management team and force the firm 
toward value maximization regardless of managers’ ownership position (McConnell and 
Servaes 1990).8
5.3  The level of dividend payments: DIVTA as dependent variable
Table 7 presents the OLS, IV-GMM, and FE estimation results with DIVTA as the depend-
ent variable. Overcash shows a positive relation with dividends, but their coefficients are 
statistically weak except for the IV-GMM in model (8). The positive relation supports 
Hypothesis 1b, suggesting that firms with overcash pay larger dividends. The overinvest-
ment variable has a negative coefficient as predicted, but their relation with dividends is 
insignificant in most models, except in FE under managerial1. However, by treating mana-
gerial1 as an endogenous variable, overinvestment coefficients are significant and positive. 
Moreover, by examining the negative signs, these results are consistent with the prediction 
of Hypothesis 2b explaining that firms with overinvestment pay less dividends.
As for the concentration variable, Table 7 reveals that concentration is a strong deter-
minant of the level of dividend payments. The finding suggests that, in line with Hypoth-
esis 3b, firms with higher concentration pay larger dividends. This demonstrates that main 
shareholders can control the managers’ decision to disburse the firm’s cash as dividends. 
This also means that by pressuring managers to pay larger dividends, the main sharehold-
ers attempt to mitigate the risk of the firm’s cash being used by managers.
On the other hand, as predicted in Hypothesis 4b, the regressions provide some evidence 
that family ownership has a negative relation with dividends as an indication of the expro-
priation risk. Foreign investors require larger dividends as shown by the positive and sig-
nificant coefficient in model (4). As predicted by the asymmetric information hypothesis, 
foreign investors would like to minimize risk by requesting higher dividend payments to 
8 In unreported results, we re-estimate the models in Tables  5 and 6 after controlling for the economic 
shocks experienced by the Indonesian market (namely the 1997–1998 Southeast Asia economic crisis and 
the 2007/2008 financial crisis) and macroeconomic changes due to business cycle changes affecting emerg-
ing markets (namely GDP, stock market index, and interest rates). Our main results still hold and did not 
reveal any qualitative difference. These unreported tables are available upon request from the authors.
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mitigate country risk. Managerial ownership has a negative and significant coefficient with 
the level of dividends. This result is contrary to Hypothesis (H5b) stating that their relation 
should be positive. However, the results in models 7 and 8 show that firms with higher man-
agerial ownership pay lower dividends. A possible explanation for this is that, as echoed by 
the free cash flow hypothesis, managers require firms to retain free cash flow by minimizing 
the distribution of dividends as they could use free cash in the pursuit of their own interests.
Table 7 also shows that state ownership (State1) is negatively correlated to dividends 
but the link is insignificant. In the SOEs, as financially healthy firms, the negative coef-
ficients indicate that the government has retained much of firms’ profit by limiting the pay-
ment of dividends. There are two explanations regarding this: first, the government would 
increase their stake by accumulating retained profits to finance firms’ growth; second, the 
government retains the profit to be tunnelled to subsidize other SOEs.
The coefficients of institutional ownership are mixed: OLS yields a negative sign but IV-GMM 
and FE have positive signs. The relation between institutional ownership and dividend payments 
under the OLS method is significant and negative, which does not support Hypothesis 8b that pre-
dicts a positive association. This suggests that institutional investors cannot control dividend deci-
sions due to low equity stakes they are allowed to hold. This maybe because Indonesia’s capital 
market regulations limit the maximum shareholdings held by institutional investors.
5.4  Heckman two‑step procedure
Table 8 presents the OLS regression, and Table 9 presents the Heckman two-step procedure 
with DPS (Panel A) and DIVTA (Panel B) as dependent variables. In these regressions, 
different types of ownership are inputted into the models by combining the variables into 
one model. In Table 8 Panel A, overcash and concentration are strongly correlated to DPS. 
These results are consistent with our hypotheses (H1b and H3b). In contrast, overinvest-
ment has a negative and insignificant link with DPS. All family variables as shown in model 
1–3 have negative but insignificant relations with DPS. In addition, the foreign and institu-
tional variables have significantly negative relations with DPS, suggesting that the higher 
the stock ownership by those types of shareholders, the less dividends are paid by the firms. 
The negative relation between foreign ownership and dividends contradicts our hypothesis 
(H5). One explanation for this finding is that foreign owners are more interested in portfolio 
investment to realize capital gains rather than being strategic investors that expect dividends.
Table 8 also shows that only managerial ownership has a positive relation with DPS, 
indicating that managers tend to disburse firms’ cash, rather than the cash is being retained 
by the firm. Further, institutional ownership has a negative and significant impact on divi-
dend payments. The result does not support Hypothesis 8b predicting that there is a posi-
tive association between the institutional ownership and cash dividends.
Table 8 Panel B shows that coefficients of overcash, overinvestment and concentration give 
similar results to those in Panel A. Family ownership (family1) in Panel B has a negative and 
significant coefficient, supporting the expropriation hypothesis in the IDX firms. The coeffi-
cient of foreign1 is positive and significant, suggesting that foreign investors require higher 
dividends to compensate the risks of doing business in Indonesia. Moreover, managerial own-
ership (managerial1 and managerial3) has a negative effect, indicating that managers could use 
the firm’s cash to maximize their interests by distributing less dividend to other shareholders.
Table  9 exhibits the Heckman regression results. Overcash is strongly correlated with 
dividends in all models under DPS and DIVTA. This supports our hypothesis (H1b) stating 
that firms with overcash pay larger dividends. Overinvestment has negative and significant 
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coefficients, which supports our hypothesis (H2b) arguing that firms with overinvestment pay 
lower dividends. On the other hand, ownership concentration is significantly and positively 
related to dividends. However, this result does not support our hypothesis (H3b) stating that 
firms with higher concentrated ownership tend to accumulate more cash and therefore pay less 
dividends.
With regards to the types of ownership, Table 8 reports more statistically significant coef-
ficients when compared to Table  9, suggesting that without considering sample selection 
bias, all types of ownership, except State, have strong relations with dividends. The negative 
and significant coefficients between those variables and level of dividends imply that firms 
pay less dividends when these types of ownership increase. On the other hand, when the 
analysis considers sample selection bias, only foreign ownership has a significant coefficient 
with negative signs, indicating that the more stocks are held by foreign investors, the less div-
idends are paid. The use of the Heckman procedure is intended to control firm samples which 
could be identified as firms having a significant relation for the propensity and the intensity 
to pay dividends. Furthermore, comparing the OLS with the Heckman two-step procedure is 
intended to deeply analyze the characteristics of the sample, ensuring the predicted statisti-
cal results are more accurate. By examining the lower parts of Table 9 Panel A, the values of 
Mill’s lambda are statistically insignificant except in model 3. In contrast, the Mill’s lambda 
coefficients in Panel B indicate that there is clearly a selection bias in all the models.
Regarding firm-specific variables, the results are generally consistent with those in the 
previous studies. Size has a positive and strongly significant relation with dividends. Firms 
with larger assets generally have established managerial and compensation systems, and 
have effective systems to control managers, which leads to less agency conflicts. There-
fore, larger firms pay higher dividends. Current growth, measured by change in sales, has a 
negative and significant relation with dividends suggesting that firms rely on internal funds 
by retaining a part of their profits to support their growth rather than by exploiting external 
financing (Chow et al. 2012). The result supports the hypothesis of dividends as residual, 
stating that as long as the firms can invest in projects with positive NPV, they would rather 
use their free cash flows to finance the projects than paying them as dividends to sharehold-
ers. Market to book value, as a proxy for future growth, has a positive but insignificant 
relation with dividends. The positive relation indicates that the higher the future growth 
prospects, the larger the dividends, suggesting that firms with growth expectations tend to 
attract prospective and potential investors and retain existing investors by paying larger div-
idends. Both future and current growth proxies have different signs, indicating that future 
prospects and historical growth have different effects on the level of dividends.
Leverage has a negative and significant association with dividends. High leverage is a 
consequence of the availability of funds to pay off the debt and thus affects the magnitude of 
the level of dividends. The results of the fixed charges variable are consistent with leverage. 
Firms with high fixed payment charges, i.e., for paying interest and preferred stock divi-
dends, pay less dividends. On the other hand, other results show that leverage has a positive 
but insignificant relation with dividend as it is combined with the percentage of stock own-
ership variables (Table 8, model 1). The positive relation indicates that firms could use debt 
to maintain the level of dividend payment when earnings do not suffice to pay dividends.
Firms gaining higher profitability pay larger dividends as shown by the positive and 
significant coefficients. In contrast, financial risk, measured by the beta of the firm, has a 
negative relation with dividends, suggesting that firms with higher risk pay less dividends. 
This indicates that when firms have high sensitivity and high uncertainty regarding the 
dynamics of market and industry, they anticipate such conditions by paying dividends and 
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retaining more availability of cash in the firm. Finally, age has a strong and positive relation 
with dividends, indicating that the older the firms, the larger the dividends.
6  Concluding remarks
Using a sample of Indonesian listed firms we assess whether a firm’s decision to deviate 
from optimal targets by having overcash holdings and overinvesting affects the dividend 
payout policy; and evaluate the role of corporate governance represented by different owner-
ship structure and types on the firm’s likelihood of altering its dividends payout decisions.
Without controlling for sample selection bias, overcash and concentration significantly 
and positively affect a firm’s intensity to pay dividends. Similar with the propensity for 
paying dividends, family ownership has a negative association with the intensity of paying 
dividends, suggesting that firms with higher family ownership pay less dividends. The find-
ings suggest that corporate managers are under strict control by family-related shareholders 
and they have made dividend decisions to the detriment of minority shareholders. Hence, 
the findings support the expropriation hypothesis, by which the rights of minority interests 
are put at risk by family stock owners.
Heckman two-step procedures reveal other important results as sample selection bias is con-
sidered. Overcash, overinvestment and level of concentration strongly affect the intensity of 
dividend payments. In contrast, the ownership variables of ownership, family, foreign, state and 
institutional have negative and significant associations with dividends. This signals the expro-
priation of firms’ wealth by majority shareholders. These findings strongly support the hypoth-
esis which commonly applies to firms with higher level of concentration or to firms in a weak 
legal environment. However, foreign ownership negatively affects dividends payout, similar to 
family ownership, indicating that they require the firm’s cash to be reinvested into the firm or, in 
contrast, use the firm’s cash to be shifted to other businesses among their business groups.
The implications of this study encompass three aspects: academic, theoretical, and prac-
tical. Academically, this is the first study to examine the association between overcash, 
overinvestment and dividends policy by focusing on emerging markets, particularly in a 
country with a high level of ownership concentration, Indonesia. Theoretically, this study 
contributes to the corporate finance literature in association with agency theory and cor-
porate governance which relates to the disclosure of empirical evidence of expropriation 
undertaken by controlling shareholders. Practically, the findings of this study can be a ref-
erence for the Indonesian Capital Market Supervisory Board to make strategic decisions or 
regulations regarding the protection of minority shareholders.
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